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1. Introduction
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) are defined by the Mirriam-Webster Dictionary as “an
initial offering of a company’s stock” (2020). IPOs are a well-researched category of
investments and multiple studies have noted a tendency for long-run
underperformance during the first years after the listing. The most scrutinized market
in the world regarding IPO performance is the USA (e.g. Ibbotson, 1975; Ritter, 1991;
Ritter & Welch, 2002; Gompers & Lerner, 2003), however, many studies are focused
on other markets, such as Europe or Asia (e.g. Keloharju, 1993; Bergström et al.,
2006; Hoque, H., 2014). A market which has been largely ignored due to its smaller
size is the Finnish market. By conducting a quantitative analysis of the market
investors gain insight into the price performance of Finnish IPOs when compared to
the market in general. This helps investors make more informed decisions. The
understanding of underpricing also helps companies planning on going public decide
on their initial offering price, as underpricing essentially means “leaving money on the
table”.
1.1. Background
Multiple studies have found evidence of performance anomalies both during the
“initial” period and in the long-run. Stock performance is defined as the price change
of a stock versus a chosen benchmark or index during the same period.  The initial
period is the period between the setting of the initial offering price and the closing price
after the first day trading in a stock exchange. The long-run is in most studies defined
as anything between 24 months to 5 years after issuance. This paper will provide
information of price performance on a sample of listings between 2005 and 2016 on
the OMXH Main List. The focus is on the initial stage and the underpricing of offerings,
as well as on the long-run performance which for this paper is defined as three years.
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1.2. Research Problem
The main research problem for this thesis is the long-run performance of Finnish IPOs.
The secondary problem is the underpricing theory and how it affects the first day
returns of IPOs on the OMXH main list.
1.3. Research Questions and Objectives
This thesis poses three research questions:
I. Do Finnish IPOs on average underperform the market index of the
Helsinki Stock Exchange at their three-year maturity?
II. To what extent are issues underpriced?
III. Do companies with a higher market valuation at the initial offering fare
better during the three years following the listing?
To explore the performance of Finnish IPOs between 2005 and 2016 I will be
conducting the following things. Firstly, I will review previous studies on IPO
performance and underpricing on the Finnish market and international markets such
as the US and Germany, as well as identify knowledge gaps and formulate research
questions related to these knowledge gaps. Second, I will collect data about the stock
prices of new issues on the OMXH Main List as well as the index data for the period
of 2005 to 2016 and analyze the collected data to find answers to research questions.
Third, I will report the findings and discuss their relevance for the literature and draw
conclusions. Finally, I will present limitations for my research and point out possible
further research avenues.
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2. Literature review
It is necessary to review past studies regarding Initial Public Offerings (IPO) and their
underperformance to conduct a more efficient analysis about the current situation in
Finland. By identifying similarities and differences in the results of studies made on the
subject in the past it should come clear whether or not these findings can be used for
comparison with the results of studies conducted in Finland. The main areas of interest
are the long-run underperformance of IPOs, the theory of underpricing and the overall
performance of IPOs. Within financial theory this study focuses on the market
efficiency side rather than on behavioral factors. Therefore, the efficient market
hypothesis will be discussed in addition to information asymmetry as factors causing
underpricing and long-run underperformance. Previous literature should aid in
formulating the methodology of research conducted for this paper regarding how
benchmarks should be chosen and what indexes should be utilized for comparison.
The IPO process is presented in Figure 1, which shows a general timeline about how
the process flows from start to finish.
Figure 1: The IPO Process (Corporate Finance Institute, 2015)
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2.1. Why do firms go public?
The main driver behind an IPO is to solve the financing problem for a company. When
contemplating the varying forms of financing for a company, there are two main
compartments under which most financing options belong: equity financing and debt
financing. Debt financing usually means loans from banks, other financial institutions,
or from varying angel investors. Companies relying on debt are generally private. If a
company relies on equity financing, the company is usually public. By expanding their
ownership base a company seeks to raise capital. The first time a company offers
shares for investors to buy is called the Initial Public Offering (IPO) and it is generally
connected to the company’s intention of listing on a stock exchange. Initial public
offerings offer an option for an investor to buy shares in a company prior to the listing
and the prestige which is connected to stock exchanged public companies.
While there have been multiple studies on the performance of IPOs, little is understood
about the more exact reasons behind going public. While there are speculations on
the subject, a study conducted by Pagano et al. (1998) is one of the few testing
different IPO theories. The conclusion of the study conducted on 69 Italian firms that
went public between 1982 and 1992 was that Italian firms primarily seek to rebalance
their leverage and reduce their cost of credit after the IPO. However, as the study is
conducted on one market and the number of IPOs is relatively low it is questionable
whether their conclusions can be generalized to other markets (ibid). Bancel and
Mittoo (2009) survey chief financial officers (CFOs) from 12 European countries
regarding the reasons behind the IPO decision. The main reasons for going public
according to the interviewed CFOs are the visibility and prestige associated with listed
firms, as well as the broadened shareholder base which results from the IPO. Another
factor considered as a major motivation for going public is the funding for growth which
is gained by the IPO (ibid). Ritter and Welch (2002) concur with this, stating that the
primary reason is the desire to raise equity capital for the firm. On the other hand, in a
study examining over 17,000 IPOs in 38 countries Kim and Weisbach (2008) conclude
that while almost all firms raise substantial amounts of capital during the IPO, the funds
are used for several purposes. This is further supported by the study conducted by
Bancel and Mittoo, who found that while there are some reasons which are associated
with IPOs more, overall the cash raised through the IPO is used for several purposes.
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They further state that “…the decision to go public is a complex one that cannot be
explained by one single theory because firms seek multiple benefits in going public.”
(ibid: 844)
2.2. Underpricing of IPOs
One main part of the IPO process shown in Figure 1 is the pricing of the stock. This
includes the firm analyzing its current worth, the demand and other quantitative and
qualitative factors, and setting the stock price to a price which reflects them. The price
floated during the IPO period (the period from when the listing prospectus is shared to
the public to the moment the stock exchange opens on the first day) is often
significantly different to the closing day price of the first day in the stock exchange.
There have been multiple studies showing that IPOs are generally underpriced which
leads to significant first day returns. An IPO is generally viewed as a positive signal
about the firm’s future growth which in turn affects the announcement day stock price
positively. “Informed traders seek to capitalize on this price run-up by purchasing stock
before the event and selling it immediately afterwards.” (Abraham et al., 2015: 574)
This is due to information asymmetry which will be discussed later on in this literature
review. A study by Ritter (1998) states that the mean initial return of IPOs in the US is
about 15 per cent. Concurring with this, a study by Aggarwal and Rivoli (2001) comes
to the conclusion that “…if an investor had purchased each IPO at the offering date
and price and held the investment for one day, the rate of return earned would be
10,67 percentage points higher than from similarly timed investments in the NASDAQ
index.” (p.47) The same study also concludes that nearly all price adjustment happens
during the first trading day, which in turn would indicate that the aftermarket for IPOs
is quite efficient. Studies conducted on the Finnish market have had similar results.
Keloharju (1993) notes that the average initial excess return on IPOs in Finland is 8,7
per cent with a sample of 80 IPOs listed between 1960 and 1992, while a later study
by Hahl et al. (2014) reports a mean first-day return of 15,6 per cent for a sample of
67 IPOs listed between 1994 and 2006. While the sample sizes for studies conducted
on the Finnish market are relatively small, the results align with studies conducted on
larger markets and can therefore be considered as valid.
Lindemann
Page 6 of 31
2.3. Secondary Market Performance
2.3.1. Reasons for underperformance
From the viewpoint of an investor focusing on the aftermarket, the performance of
IPOs after the offering can be considered as vital to the investment decision. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, the initial returns of new listings have generally
been abnormally high. However, after a while the returns seem to drop below
benchmark returns. Multiple studies have recorded significant underperformance
amongst IPO firms in the long run (Abraham, R. et al., 2016; Ibbotson, R., 1975;
Keloharju, M., 1993; Ritter, J., 1991), which would indicate that IPOs are a risky
investment as opposed to already established securities on the stock market.
Underperformance is defined as having smaller returns than similar established listed
companies during the same time period. Loughran and Ritter (1995) find that negative
returns in the long-run result from investor overestimation as they seek to pick the big
winners on the market. A study by Jain and Kini (1994) similarly found that information
asymmetry between the firm and investors has an effect on the underperformance in
the long-run. As stated by Abraham et al. (2015), an informed trader seeks to capitalize
on the overestimation and information asymmetry of others by buying shares at an
IPO and selling them immediately in the aftermarket. Ritter (1991: 4) further states that
underperformance is partially caused by “…a scenario of firms going public when
investors are irrationally overoptimistic about the future potential of certain industries.”
While most studies regard IPOs as a homogeneous group, other factors should also
be taken into account. In the past decades, globalization has led to even smaller firms
conducting business across borders and this can also be seen among firms with IPOs.
Mauer et al. (2015: 453) find that “…globally diversified firms going public can more
fully price their shares in the market (i.e. leave less money on the table) and may have
better long-run performance and survival prospects than purely domestic firms.”
Similarly, Al-Shammari et al. (2013) find that the international market presence of IPO
firms makes a positive appeal to first day investors leading to them being more willing
to pay higher prices to acquire ownership in said firms. However, the study also finds
that “…high levels of internationalization tend to negatively impact the assessment of
first day investors of IPO prospects when blockholder ownership is low.” On the other
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hand, LiPuma (2012) finds that new firms with higher levels of internationalization
execute their IPOs at a later stage, which would indicate that those firms are more
established at the IPO from an investors point of view.
2.3.2. Evidence of IPO underperformance
The numerical evidence of underperformance is significant for investors. Most studies
analyzing the underperformance of IPOs have been conducted on the US market as
it is the most significant stock market in the world with its companies having a total
market capitalization of over 33 trillion USD. The second largest market is China with
a market cap of 6 trillion USD. (World Bank, 2018) Because of its significantly larger
market size the US market offers researchers a larger sample of IPOs than for
example smaller markets like Finland.
2.3.3. Evidence of underperformance from the United States
During the last century multiple studies have recorded the underperformance of IPOs
on the US market. While the results are similar between the various studies, different
time periods offer varying results. Ibbotson (1975) studies IPOs issued in the 1960s
and finds evidence that IPOs have “generally positive performance during the first
year, negative performance the next 3 years, and generally positive performance the
last [fifth] year.” Ritter (1998) finds similar results regarding fourth- and fifth-year
positive alphas. However, the high standard errors in Ibbotson’s studies prevent him
from rejecting market efficiency. In an earlier study Ritter (1991) analyzes the long-run
performance of 1526 initial public offerings by excluding the first day of trading. He
finds that if an investor were to invest in IPOs at the end of the first trading day and
use a 3-year buy-and-hold strategy, they would have cumulative abnormal returns of
negative 26,1 percent. Similarly, Carter et al. (1998) measured a negative 19,9 percent
cumulative abnormal return during 765 days post-announcement. The previously
mentioned studies all compared the IPO performance to a set of companies from
similar industries with similar sizes and operations to measure the alpha. Gompers
and Lerner (2003) argue that while there is some underperformance when event-time
buy-and-hold abnormal returns are used, they are not statistically significant.
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According to the study “The underperformance disappears when we use cumulative
abnormal returns. A calendar-time analysis shows that IPOs return at least as much
as the market over the entire sample period.” (p. 1390) Ritter and Welch (2002)
concede that while the evidence supports the theories of underperformance, caution
should be used while analyzing results as “the results are sensitive not only to
methodology also to the exact time period.” (p. 1823)
2.3.4. Evidence from the rest of the World
While the majority of academic studies have focused on the US market due to its
significantly larger size, many have studied the underpricing and underperformance
theories on other markets as well. Berk and Peterle (2015) study the
underperformance of IPOs between 200 and 2009 in Central and Eastern Europe,
focusing on Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovenia.
They find that, on average, IPOs in the region underperform European benchmarks
by -14,5 to -31,3 percent, depending on the model used. (ibid) Similarly, Bessler and
Thies (2007) find that German IPOs on average underperform their benchmark (the
major German stock index DAX) by -26,3 to -48,9 percent, depending on the initial
returns. They note that the results are fairly stable, as less than 30 percent of their
sample IPOs have positive abnormal returns during their 36-month frame. Differing
from other studies on other European markets, Thomadakis et al. (2012) find that the
Greek market actually overperforms much further beyond the initial surge reported in
other markets, continuing for nearly two years post-IPO. However, similarly to other
markets, the study also finds the third year returns to be negative, concluding that
“...even where there are longer-lasting positive excess returns after IPOs, eventually
negative returns emerge.” (p. 139) The Chinese market has similar results as other
markets, with Chen and Kenbata (2011) finding significant buy-and-hold abnormal
return underperformance. However, they also find a link between underwriter prestige,
with IPOs managed by more prestigious underwriters delivering higher returns.
The performance of Finnish IPOs has been studied at varying points of time.
(Keloharju, 1993; Westerholm, 2006; Hahl et al., 2013) As they focus on the same
market as this study, they are further used for methodology for comparison purposes.
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Keloharju (1993) compared the returns on IPOs to a value-weighted index. The results
he presents show that during the period the index returns -1,6 percent, IPOs have an
average return on -22,4 percent at their three-year anniversary. Westerholm (2006)
finds that IPOs on the Finnish market have an average buy-and-hold average return
of -12,6 percent per year for five years following the IPO when compared to the
Helsinki Stock Exchange index consisting of all shares. Similarly, Hahl et al. (2013)
report that “The average market-adjusted return for holding IPO stocks during the first
three post- issue years is −30 per cent.” (p.29) However, they also find that the
apparent long-run underperformance “...can be largely explained by size and
momentum effects.” (p. 29)
2.4. Efficient market hypothesis
To consider long-run underperformance from the standpoint of an investor, information
asymmetry and efficient market hypothesis needs to be discussed. The efficient
market hypothesis (EMH) is a theory suggested at the beginning of the 20th century
and further developed by Eugene Fama in 1970. According to EMH an investor should
not be able to beat the market on a long-term as all information related to stock prices
is freely available and shared among all investors. This leads to the hypothesis that if
all investors have access to all the aforementioned information, stocks always trade
at their fair market value and thereby it is impossible to buy for example undervalued
stocks. The three forms of EMH are weak, semi-strong and strong, based on the
amount of information available to traders. As the strong form relies on a monopolistic
access to information which would require insider information, it is considered the least
relevant. Only the semi-strong form of EMH is required for the stock prices to reflect
all available information, since insider information is illegal in most countries. The
semi-strong form suggests that all public information is reflected in the prices. In
relation to the IPO markets, the EMH is considered by most to hold up. In his study in
1975, Ibbotson states that “...results generally confirm that there are no departures
from market efficiency.” Ritter (1991) arrives at a similar conclusion that after the IPO,
EMH seems to hold up. Informational asymmetry in the context of IPOs indicates that
before the actual listing the information available for investors might be scarcer than
in the aftermarket, which leads to the significant first day returns common in IPOs.
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Abraham et al. (2016) find that the underpricing phenomena is mainly due to
“...informed traders holding private information about the firm’s future cash flows.” (p.
574) Similarly, Hoque (2014) reaches the conclusion that information asymmetry is
the main driver behind underpricing in most IPOs. By studying IPOs in the UK, he finds
that while it is not the main driver in all IPOs, it nonetheless affects all to some extent.
2.5. Hypotheses and Conceptual framework
Based on previous literature and the aforementioned research questions, this paper
seeks to confirm three hypotheses.
H1: On average Finnish IPOs perform worse at the third-year anniversary than
benchmark indices during the same period.
H2: Finnish IPOs are underpriced on average by more than 5 per cent and therefore
see significant first day returns for investors.
H3: Companies with a bigger market capitalization perform better in the years after the
IPO.
The hypotheses answer in order the three research questions posed at the beginning
of this paper. The first question asks if Finnish IPOs underperform in the long-run.
Based on previous research both on the Finnish market (Hahl et al., 2014; Keloharju,
M., 1993; Westerholm, J., 2006) and on international markets (Ibbotson, R., 1975;
Ritter, J.; 1991; Bessler & Thies, 2007; Chen & Kenbata, 2011) this paper seeks to
find a clear indication that IPOs have smaller returns in the long-run than their
benchmark indices. The second hypothesis answers the second research question
regarding underpricing. Again, the hypothesis is formed based on strong evidence
from previous studies in the subject. (Bergström et al., 2006; Hoque, H., 2014;
Keloharju, M., 1993) The methodology regarding the measuring of underpricing will be
presented later. The third hypothesis answers the last research question which seeks
to find a correlation between market capitalization and IPO performance. This
hypothesis has the least unanimous conclusions in previous studies.
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Figure 2: Conceptual framework (Lindemann, 2020)
Figure 2 presents the conceptual framework for this paper. It is based on previous
literature and offers an overview of the scope and objective of this study. By utilizing
the methodology and insights gained through previous literature this study seeks to
find a clear indication of underpricing and long-run underperformance among Finnish
IPOs during the period of 2005 to 2016. Through the quantitative analysis regarding
performance it will also come clear whether there are differences in post-IPO
performance of small cap and big cap companies. This study acknowledges the
efficient market hypothesis and the informational asymmetry being the main drivers
behind first day returns.
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3. Methodology
3.1. Data
The data for this thesis consists of stock data for listed companies between 2005 and
2016 on the Helsinki stock exchange main list. The data is acquired by accessing
historical stock and index rates through Thomson Reuters Datastream and Eikon,
respectively. The data is extracted into Microsoft Excel, where the calculations outlined
later are performed. The share subscription prices are acquired from the companies
listing prospectuses. During the period of 2005-2016 35 companies listed on the main
list of the Helsinki stock exchange. However, for the purposes of this study some
companies in the sample years had to be excluded. Companies which delisted during
the 3-year study period are excluded, as are splits, re-listings, moves from the First
North list to the main list and companies for which the required stock data wasn’t
accessible through Datastream. After applying these restrictions, this study is left with
13 listings.
As one of the objectives of this study is to analyze the differences between smaller
IPOs and larger ones, the 13 listings are divided into two groups. The dividing factor
is the company’s market value after the initial day of trading; companies with a market
value of under 100 million and over 100 million. This divides the sample into 6 listings
with a market value under and 7 listings with a market value over 100 million.
3.2. Methods
To measure the underpricing and long-run performance of the sample listings, a few
different methods are used. For underpricing, the initial return period is defined as the
period from the beginning of the IPO (the moment shares are first sold during the
offering) to the closing of the first day of trading. The IPO price is the share subscription
price which is stated in the final listing prospectus for investors. Underpricing is
therefore measured as the benchmark adjusted returns of the first day of trading. The
initial raw return of stock i is calculated as
Lindemann
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ݎ௜ = ݌௖ − ݌௣݌௟
where pc is the closing price after the initial day of trading and pp is the final subscription
price. By dividing the difference of the two with the the final subscription price the
percentage difference is reached. The final subscription prices are announced a few
days before the first day on the stock exchange. The raw returns are used to calculate
the abnormal returns which are defined as
ܽݎ௜௧ = ݎ௜ − ݎ௠
where arit is the abnormal return of investment i during time period t and rm is the return
of the benchmark index over the same period. The same formula is later used to
calculate the abnormal returns over longer periods of time. However, when calculating
the abnormal returns pc is the closing price of the end of the period and pp is the closing
price of the first day of trading. To get the average abnormal return for multiple listings,
ARt is calculated as the arithmetic average of the benchmark adjusted returns for n
number of firms. The formula is as follows:
ܣܴ௧ = 1݊෍ܽݎ௜௧௡
௜ୀଵ
Long-run performance is in this study defined as the performance from the closing
price of the first day trading to the closing price at the three-year anniversary. For this
purpose, three things are calculated: the three-year raw buy-and-hold returns,
abnormal returns, and the wealth relatives. The three-year raw buy-and-hold returns
are calculated in the same manner as the initial raw returns; subtracting the first day
closing price from the price at the three-year anniversary and dividing it with the first
day closing price. Similarly, the benchmark adjusted returns are also calculated by
subtracting benchmark performance from the raw buy-and-hold returns.
As used by Ritter (1991) to interpret the 3-year raw returns, a wealth relative is
calculated for each of the stocks. The wealth relative is calculated as follows
ܹܴ௜ = 1 + ݎ௧1 + ݎ௠
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where rt is the raw return for the three years and rm is the return of the benchmark
index during the same period. A wealth relative of over 1 would indicate that the stock
has outperformed the market during the period, while a wealth relative less than 1
indicates underperformance.
3.3. Benchmarks
There are varying methods used in previous literature for choosing the benchmarks to
which the IPO performances are compared. The most detailed method mentioned is
creating a benchmark portfolio consisting of companies that are matched to the IPOs
by industry and size. Ritter (1991) created benchmark group indices with said method
consisting of companies matched by size and industry. However, for the purposes of
this paper a different approach was chosen.
A more general method of benchmarking listings is by comparing the performance of
IPOs against a general market index. This method of benchmarking chosen
companies against general or more specific stock exchange indices is used in various
studies. For example, Bergström et al. (2006) in their study of the London and Paris
stock exchanges utilize the main indexes. For London they utilize FTSE ALLSHARE
and for Paris MIDCAC. In addition to these they also test the robustness of their study
by comparing their data from London to other indexes such as FTSE250, FTSE350
and FT250VA. Similarly, Bessler and Thiess (2007) compare their German IPO
samples buy-and-hold abnormal returns to the DAX index. In addition to the DAX they
also employ a few value-weighted research indices, namely the DAFOX-VW and
DAFOX-SC-VW.
The index used for the purposes of this study is the OMXHPI. It consists of all listed
companies in the Helsinki stock exchange and is equally weighted, meaning that it
doesn’t take into account the market capitalization of the stocks comprising the index.
By comparing the sample listings to this index, it gives a clear answer to how they
have performed compared to the general market. A method using specific indices
comprised of similar companies of size and industry would give only an answer to how
the listings perform in their industry, while ignoring the general market.
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4. Findings
After performing the previously outlined calculations on the stock data gathered on the
13 sample firms, the results are combined into a few differing tables. To further bring
attention to the main findings, the findings are compared in relation to the set
hypotheses. First, the long-run performance of both small cap and large cap
companies are presented consequently from six months to the third-year maturity.
Then, the first day returns are presented for comparison with the underpricing
phenomena. Finally, the small cap and large cap samples are compared to find
differences between their long-run performances. Table 1 shows the raw returns and
index adjusted returns of listings with a market valuation of less than a 100 million
euros after their first day of trading. The table contains the returns for varying time
periods from the initial day (1 day) to the third-year maturity (36 months). On the right
in the table are the means, trimmed means and standard deviations of the row. The
trimmed mean was chosen as a method of comparison, as it removes the distortion
caused by significantly high or low outliers. For example, Table 1 has as significantly
high outlier on its 24- and 36-months rows which causes the mean to be quite high.
Table 1: Non-adjusted and index adjusted returns for sample companies with a Market Valuation under
100 Million euros
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24 months -18,71 % -1,75 % -3,42 % 171,87 % 8,12 % -1,84 % 25,71 % 0,28 % 65,84 %
36 months -23,49 % -37,09 % 23,74 % 204,43 % -2,03 % -36,73 % 21,47 % -9,63 % 84,53 %
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1 day -1,30 % 0,13 % 7,96 % 4,26 % 23,40 % 5,78 % 6,70 % 4,53 % 8,11 %
6 months -45,83 % 22,04 % -18,78 % 21,88 % -8,22 % 24,02 % -0,82 % 4,23 % 26,01 %
12 months -76,78 % 21,74 % -33,50 % 49,49 % -12,90 % 46,56 % -0,90 % 5,47 % 45,22 %
24 months -57,51 % -18,14 % -22,04 % 154,54 % 1,94 % -15,17 % 7,27 % -13,35 % 68,22 %
36 months -50,65 % -61,16 % 9,77 % 184,35 % -4,48 % -43,36 % 5,74 % -22,18 % 83,75 %
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Table 2 shows the raw returns and index adjusted returns for the sample companies
which had a market valuation of more than a 100 million euros after the first day of
trading. Formulated in the same way as Table 1, it also shows the mean and trimmed
mean returns and standard deviations for the same time periods as Table 1 for ease
of comparability.
Table 2: Non-adjusted and index adjusted returns for sample companies with a market valuation of over
100 million euros
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1 day -0,31 % -8,91 % 3,32 % -32,35 % 15,69 % 0,00 % 0,00 % -3,22 % -1,18 % 13,68 %
6 months -24,76 % -44,85 % -7,48 % 63,39 % 52,71 % 37,31 % 26,73 % 14,72 % 16,90 % 37,92 %
1 year -1,88 % -44,44 % -2,89 % 48,00 % 92,20 % 35,07 % 43,47 % 24,22 % 24,35 % 41,07 %
2 years 12,23 % -58,59 % 21,26 % 53,83 % 92,20 % 3,81 % 69,31 % 27,72 % 32,08 % 46,09 %
3 years -59,87 % -33,33 % 64,04 % 4,35 % -28,54 % 17,16 % 106,73 % 10,08 % 4,74 % 54,26 %
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1 day -0,16 % -10,14 % 3,97 % -31,50 % 15,23 % 1,29 % 0,48 % -2,98 % -0,91 % 13,54 %
6 months -17,15 % -44,73 % 8,67 % 62,72 % 46,31 % 30,91 % 11,60 % 14,05 % 16,07 % 34,14 %
1 year -10,23 % -22,44 % 8,81 % 55,13 % 73,02 % 15,89 % 31,27 % 21,64 % 20,17 % 31,65 %
2 years 12,35 % -8,09 % 20,56 % 39,82 % 66,37 % -22,03 % 62,43 % 24,49 % 25,41 % 31,21 %
3 years -9,35 % 8,82 % 57,72 % -15,51 % -49,74 % -4,04 % 94,24 % 11,73 % 7,53 % 44,95 %
4.1. Long-run performance
Long-run performance findings will be presented first as they are the main subject of
this thesis. While the term “long-run” is defined as being three years for the purposes
of this study, it is also essential to consider the price evolution during the years
between the two time points. It also adds to the value of this study to note the
similarities and differences between the smaller and higher value companies, as this
might give insight for investors as to how timing an investment might affect returns.
The following chapters present the results of this study and conclude by reviewing the
implications on the aforementioned hypotheses.
Lindemann
Page 17 of 31
4.1.1. 6 months
Table 1 shows that the smaller companies have a mean raw return of -1,47 per cent
while the trimmed mean is -0,09 per cent. The standard deviation is 23,19 per cent.
Out of the six companies, three have positive raw returns and three negative ones.
Notable is that the three positive and negative returns are all significantly high or low;
the companies with a positive return returned at least 16,33 per cent (Consti Yhtiöt),
while the companies with negative returns lost at least -15,49 per cent (Restamax).
This causes the standard deviation to be nearly three times higher than with the initial
returns reported in the previous chapter. When adjusted with the market index, the
mean returns are slightly closer to zero at -0,82 per cent, but the trimmed mean rises
to 4,23 per cent. The standard deviation also slightly increases to 26,01 per cent.
The larger companies have significantly differing returns, both raw and adjusted, after
six months when comparing to the results shown in Table 1. Table 2 reports that the
mean raw return after six months is 14,72 per cent, while the trimmed mean is 16,90
per cent. The standard deviation, however, is larger than amongst the smaller
companies, as the standard deviation for the larger companies after six months is
37,92 per cent. When adjusted by the market index, the mean falls slightly to 14,05
per cent, while the trimmed mean is 16,07 per cent. The standard deviation for the
adjusted returns after six months is 34,14 per cent. Most of the larger companies
outperform the market at the six-month point, with five out of the seven companies
having positive returns. There is also a similar gap between the gainers and losers, as
the losers lost at least -17,15 per cent and the gainers returned at least 8,67 per cent,
when adjusted by the market.
4.1.2. One year
After one year on the market the smaller companies have a mean raw return of 5,15
per cent, with the trimmed mean being 7,81 per cent. The standard deviation of the
stock prices at this point is 39,38 per cent. The gain in the mean from the six-months
timepoint is mainly caused by two stocks (Kotipizza and Consti Yhtiöt) gaining by over
20 per cent each, while only one company had significant losses in stock price
(Affecto). The adjusted return mean is -0,90 per cent while the trimmed mean is 5,47
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per cent. The standard deviation of the market adjusted returns at this point is nearly
six percent higher than the non-adjusted one, 45,22 per cent. This is mainly caused
by Affectos stock price losses being even more extreme than before adjustment. The
mean is also severely affected by the market adjusted returns of Affecto, while the
trimmed mean (which doesn’t note Affecto due to it being an outlier) is affected by the
adjustment differences of the other stock.
The larger companies on the other hand have a mean raw return of 24,22 per cent,
while the trimmed return is nearly identical at 24,35 per cent. The standard deviation
of the raw returns at this point is 41,07 per cent. The main cause for the high standard
deviation at this point is Lehto Groups outstandingly high raw return of 92,20 per cent.
When adjusted by the market, the mean return drops slightly to 21,64 per cent, while
the trimmed mean fall to 20,17 per cent. The market adjusted returns at this point have
a smaller standard deviation at 31,65 per cent. The main reason for this is the high
market growth between Lehto Groups stock price at six months and one year, which
adjusts the price of the stock by nearly 20 per cent.
4.1.3. Two years
After two years Table 1 shows that the smaller companies have a higher mean raw
return than after the first year with a mean of 25,71 per cent. However, the mean is
largely affected by the considerably high returns of Kotipizza, which returns 171,87
per cent from its first day closing to its second-year maturity. When it is excluded, the
trimmed mean is 0,28 per cent. The standard deviation is 65,84 per cent, which is
mainly caused by Kotipizza. The adjusted mean at of the smaller companies at two
years is 7,27 per cent and the trimmed mean is -13,35 per cent. The large difference
between the raw return mean and adjusted mean is explained by the large market
fluctuations during the two-year periods of five of the six companies. For example, the
market adjusted return for Affecto is -57,51 per cent from the first day to the second-
year maturity, while the raw return is -18,71 per cent. This means that Affecto
underperformed the market by nearly 30 per cent during its first two years. The
standard deviation for the adjusted returns is 68,22 per cent, which is again caused
mainly by the abnormally high returns of Kotipizza.
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Companies with a larger market valuation seem to experience more consistent growth
as the mean raw return after two years is 27,72 per cent, while the trimmed mean is
32,08 per cent. The higher trimmed mean is caused by the exclusion of SRV Yhtiöt,
which experienced significant losses during their second year, mainly due to the 2008-
2009 financial crisis. The standard deviation of the second-year raw returns is 46,09
per cent, which is considerably smaller than that of the smaller companies. The
adjusted return mean is 24,49 per cent while the trimmed mean is 25,41 per cent.
While SRV Yhtiöt saw their stock price diminish due to the financial crisis, when
compared to the market their returns were only -8,09 per cent. The standard deviation
of the second-year adjusted returns is 31,21 per cent which is smaller than that of their
previous year. Only two of the seven companies have a negative adjusted return after
the first two years.
4.1.4. Three years
The main determinative time point for this study is the third-year maturity, as three
years is defined as the “long-run” for the purposes of this thesis. The returns of the
sample companies from their first year to the third-year maturity will determine if the
first hypothesis of this thesis stands true. Table 1 shows that the raw returns for the
smaller companies have a mean of 21,47 per cent, which is again largely distorted
due to Kotipizza’s raw return of 204,43 per cent to their third-year maturity. The
trimmed mean after three years is -9,63 per cent and the standard deviation is 84,53
per cent. The adjusted return mean after three years is 5,74 per cent, while the
trimmed mean is -22,8 per cent. The significant drop from the mean raw return to the
mean adjusted return is mainly due to three of the stocks experiencing a market growth
of 20 per cent or more during their first three years. Four companies out of the sample
six underperform the market by at least -2,03 per cent (Evli Pankki), while the
remaining to outperform by at least 23,74 per cent (Restamax).
The larger companies have a mean raw return of 10,08 per cent, while the trimmed
mean is 4,74 per cent. The standard deviation for the raw returns is 54,26 per cent.
The seven companies have two outliers, as DNA returns 106,73 per cent to their third-
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year maturity, while Affecto loses 59,87 per cent. When adjusted by the market index,
the mean return is 11,73 per cent and the trimmed mean is 7,53 per cent. The standard
deviation of the adjusted returns is 44,95 per cent. Only three out of the seven
companies outperform the market at their third-year maturity, with the remaining three
losing at least -4,04 per cent (Tokmanni).
Table 3: Wealth relatives of sample companies at three-year maturity
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To further detail the long-run performance of the sample companies, a wealth relative
is calculated for each of the companies. A wealth relative of over 1 would indicate that
the stock outperforms the market at three-year maturity, while a wealth relative of less
than 1 means that the stock underperformed the market during the period. As can be
seen in Table 3, the mean wealth relative for the smaller companies is 1,0465, while
the trimmed mean is 0,8092. The mean for the larger companies is 1,1084 while the
trimmed mean is 1,0662. This would indicate that during the period of 2005 to 2016,
larger companies have produced a better buy-and-hold return from the first day closing
to the third-year maturity than smaller companies. In simple terms, one euro invested
in a hypothetical portfolio consisting of the larger companies would at the three-year
maturity be worth 1,0662 euros (which is adjusted for market growth i.e. inflation),
while a euro invested in the smaller companies would only be worth 0,8092 euros. It
is worth noting that both the sample of smaller companies and the one consisting of
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larger ones hold within them more companies which underperformed the market to
their third-year maturity than companies which outperformed.
Table 4: Combined index adjusted returns for the sample
OMXHPI adjusted 1 day 6 months 12 months 24 months 36 months
Affecto -1,30 % -45,83 % -76,78 % -57,51 % -50,65 %
Ovaro 0,13 % 22,04 % 21,74 % -18,14 % -61,16 %
Restamax 7,96 % -18,78 % -33,50 % -22,04 % 9,77 %
Kotipizza 4,26 % 21,88 % 49,49 % 154,54 % 184,35 %
Evli Pankki 23,40 % -8,22 % -12,90 % 1,94 % -4,48 %
Consti Yhtiöt 5,78 % 24,02 % 46,56 % -15,17 % -43,36 %
Salcomp -0,16 % -17,15 % -10,23 % 12,35 % -9,35 %
SRV Yhtiöt -10,14 % -44,73 % -22,44 % -8,09 % 8,82 %
Asiakastieto 3,97 % 8,67 % 8,81 % 20,56 % 57,72 %
Pihlajalinna -31,50 % 62,72 % 55,13 % 39,82 % -15,51 %
Lehto Group 15,23 % 46,31 % 73,02 % 66,37 % -49,74 %
Tokmanni 1,29 % 30,91 % 15,89 % -22,03 % -4,04 %
DNA 0,48 % 11,60 % 31,27 % 62,43 % 94,24 %
MEAN 1,49 % 7,19 % 11,23 % 16,54 % 8,97 %
TRIMMED MEAN 2,50 % 6,96 % 13,62 % 10,73 % -0,60 %
STDEV 12,34 % 31,54 % 40,12 % 52,40 % 65,84 %
After studying the results outlined in Table 4, the first hypothesis (H1) would seem to
be valid when using the sample companies as a generalization for the whole market.
The hypothesis, as outlined previously was:
H1: On average Finnish IPOs perform worse at the third-year anniversary than
benchmark indices during the same period.
Since the trimmed mean adjusted return for the whole sample is -0,60 per cent, it can
be stated that on average the sample companies underperform the market index
OMXHPI at their third-year maturity. The mean 8,97 per cent cannot be considered to
represent the sample as the difference between the mean and the trimmed mean is
mainly caused by Kotipizza and its growth. The growth is caused mainly by a
Norwegian company acquiring it which resulted in high stock price growth.
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4.2. Underpricing
Table 1 shows on its first rows of data the raw returns and market index adjusted
returns for the first day of trading. The percentual growth shown is calculated as the
difference from the final offering price of the IPO before listing and the closing price
after the first day of trading. After calculating each return, the table shows that the
mean first-day raw return is 6,53 per cent while the trimmed mean is 3,80 per cent.
This would indicate that the companies in question were underpriced on average by
6,53 per cent and therefore left money on the table, meaning that they could have
priced their IPO higher and raise more capital that way. Even in the case of the Table
1 companies which had a market valuation of under 100 million euros, the underpricing
of just 6,53 per cent would mean a large amount of capital left on the table. Table 1
shows that no company in the sample had a negative first day raw return. The standard
deviation of the first day raw returns is 8,26 per cent. What is notable amongst the
smaller companies is that only one company, Evli Pankki, was underpriced by more
than 10 per cent.
The market adjusted returns reported in Table 1 differ from the raw returns. Slightly
differing from the raw returns, the mean index adjusted return is 6,70 per cent (0,17
per cent difference) while the trimmed mean is 4,53 per cent (0,73 per cent difference).
The market adjusted standard deviation is 8,11 per cent. Out of the six sample listings
three had a higher market adjusted return than a raw return, indicating that the market
declined during the first day of trading of the aforementioned three stock. The
remaining three listings had slightly smaller adjusted returns when compared to their
raw returns.
Table 2 reports the raw returns as well as the index adjusted returns of the companies
in the sample with a market valuation of over 100 million euros after the first day of
trading. The mean first day non-adjusted return for the larger companies is -3,22 per
cent, while the trimmed mean is slightly less negative at -1,18 per cent. The standard
deviation for the initial returns is 13,68 per cent. Contrary to the smaller companies,
the mean initial raw return for the larger companies is actually negative. This would
imply that the issues were actually slightly overpriced and that the companies where
therefore able to raise capital more closely to their actual market values than the
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smaller companies which left money on the table. The adjusted initial returns of the
higher valued companies have a mean of -2,98 per cent (0,24 per cent difference) and
a trimmed mean of -0,91 per cent (0,27 per cent difference). The standard deviation
for the adjusted returns is 13,54 per cent. Five of the seven companies had a higher
adjusted initial return than their initial raw return.
Based on Table 4 the second hypothesis (H2) is rejected. Hypothesis 2 was as follows:
H2: Finnish IPOs are underpriced on average by more than 5 per cent and therefore
see significant first day returns for investors.
The hypothesis is rejected as the mean underpricing for the entire sample is 1,49%
and the trimmed mean is 2,5%. Underpricing is measured as the difference between
the final listing price and the closing price of the first day. If the adjusted returns are
positive, the stock can be interpreted as being underpriced, as the market seeks to
correct the price to an upward direction. The same applies inversely as well; if a stock
is overpriced, the market adjusts the price by decreasing its value. In the case of the
second hypothesis the results are far from conclusive and can therefore not be
considered as confirming.
4.2.1. Results of the entire sample
To answer the last research question and hypothesis, a table costing of all sample
companies was compiled. Table 4 presents the combined means, trimmed means and
standard deviations for each timepoint of the whole sample.
As can be seen in Table 4, the mean first day return is 1,49 per cent, while the trimmed
mean is 2,50 per cent. Since the presented numbers are market adjusted returns, the
sample IPOs may be interpreted to have outperformed the market on average. The
standard deviation for the first day returns is 12,34 per cent. Four companies out of
the total sample have negative first day returns. After six months the mean increases
to 7,19 per cent, while the trimmed mean is 6,96 per cent. The standard deviation also
increases by nearly 20 per cent.
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By the time of the first-year maturity, the mean increases to 11,23 per cent and the
trimmed mean to 13,62 per cent. At the one-year mark five companies have negative
returns, while on average the rest outperform the market by at least 10 per cent. At
the two-year mark the mean still increases to 16,54 per cent (trimmed mean 10,73 per
cent) and the standard deviation increases to 52,40 per cent. Six companies have
negative returns at the second-year mark. At the three-year mark the mean decreases
to 8,97 per cent, with the trimmed mean dropping to -0,60 per cent. The standard
deviation amongst the final year returns reported in Table 4 is high at 65,84 per cent.
The amount of companies underperforming from the first day closing steadily climbs
from the first-year maturity (5 companies) to the third-year maturity (8 companies). The
biggest outlier of the whole sample is Kotipizza due to its excessive growth from listing
to third-year maturity.
4.2.2. Small cap versus Large cap
The third hypothesis (H3) for this thesis focused on the possible differences in long-
run returns between companies with a small market value (under 100 million euros)
and companies with a higher market value (over 100 million euros). Table 1 and Table
2 also provide a possibility to also compare the differences in first day returns and
therefore the possible underpricing differences. The underpricing issue will be
discussed in more depth in the next section. The third hypothesis was as follows:
H3: Companies with a bigger market capitalization perform better in the years after the
IPO.
Based on Table 1 and Table 2, Hypothesis 3 is true as the smaller valued companies
have a mean three-year buy-and-hold return of 5,74 per cent while the larger
companies have a mean of 11,73 per cent. The standard deviation of the larger
companies third-year returns is also significantly smaller (44,95 per cent versus 83,75
per cent). This would indicate that larger companies have more consistent positive
abnormal returns. The difference between the two samples is even more wide when
the trimmed means are compared; the trimmed mean difference between the smaller
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companies and larger companies is 29,66 per cent. The adjusted returns are also
more stable throughout the first three years, as the larger companies have positive
adjusted returns means throughout the whole three-year period while the smaller
companies fluctuate more.
5. Discussion and Analysis
Overall the findings of the study are not surprising. While the underpricing of IPOs has
been a generally accepted and much researched occurrence, this study did not find
conclusive evidence of it occurring during the period 2005 to 2016 in Finland. While
Keloharju (1993) found that Finnish IPOs issued between 1984 and 1989 where
underpriced by an average of 8,7 per cent and Hahl et al. (2014) reported the
underpricing being on average 15,6 per cent (between 1994 and 2006), this study only
found the underpricing phenomena to be true with the smaller companies (trimmed
mean 3,80 per cent). This cannot, however, be generalized due to the small sample
size. The differences between previous studies on the Finnish market and this study
can partially be explained as the impact of the listings used in the samples of previous
studies which wouldn’t have been chosen for this study due to the restrictions set on
the sample of this thesis.
While this study didn’t find evidence of underpricing occurring in the sample, the long-
run underperformance reported by Keloharju (1993) and Hahl et al. (2014) seems to
hold. The adjusted trimmed mean abnormal return for the whole sample is -0,60 per
cent. While the percentage is quite small, it still indicates long-run underperformance.
Although H1 only barely stands, H3 seems to have more evidence to support it. The
third hypothesis (H3) for this study was that larger companies perform better in the
following years after the IPO than smaller companies. Based on Table 1 and Table 2
this study concludes that between 2005 and 2016 this hypothesis stands. The reason
behind this performance difference can partially be credited to larger established
companies attracting more investors due to the perceived smaller risk. Overall it would
seem that when using market valuation as a deciding factor an investor should focus
on companies with higher valuations for better and more consistent returns. It is also
well worth noting that the company with the highest market valuation in the sample,
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DNA, had an adjusted return of 106,73 per cent from first day closing to third-year
maturity. Another factor affecting some of the returns in Table 1 and Table 2 is the
2008-2009 financial crisis. While the effects of the crisis on the stock market are
adjusted for in the abnormal returns, it doesn’t take into account the financial trouble
the crisis created for the companies.
6. Conclusions
6.1. Main Findings
The main findings of this thesis are summarized based on the research questions
outlined previously.
1. Do Finnish IPOs on average underperform the market index of the Helsinki
Stock Exchange at their three-year maturity?
After calculating the market adjusted abnormal returns, this study concludes that if
outliers are not considered, IPOs between 2005 and 2016 underperformed the
OMXHPI index by 0,6 per cent. However, as the percentage is so low it is debatable
how valid these results are when generalizing for all IPOs. The study might be affected
by the exclusion of established companies and split listings, as these tend to perform
better in the long run.
2. To what extent are issues underpriced?
The research conducted for this thesis finds that while the trimmed mean first day
OMXHPI adjusted return is 2,5 per cent, it is significantly lower than in previous studies
conducted on both the Finnish and other international markets. This result might be
due to the selection criteria which were used to restrict the IPOs eligible for this study.
However, some of the companies in the sample had high abnormal returns, which
would leave room to debate whether a careful vetting process of the listing companies
could give an IPO investor enough insight to pick the correct listings to invest in.
3. Do companies with a higher market valuation at the initial offering fare better
during the three years following the listing?
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The study finds that larger companies of the sample perform better at their three-year
maturity. The difference between the means of the smaller and larger companies is
roughly 6 per cent while the difference between the trimmed means is nearly 30 per
cent. The standard deviation of the larger companies’ returns is also nearly 40 per cent
smaller which would indicate that generally larger IPOs are a safer investment in the
long-run.
6.2. Implications for International Business
The results of this thesis might have implications for investors investing on
international markets. While this study focuses on the Finnish market, prior research
outlined in the literature review has found similar results in other markets as well.
Finding clear evidence of both underpricing and long-run underperformance will help
an investor make more informed decisions when considering an effect on both the
Finnish and international markets. From a company standpoint the main implication is
the underpricing theory. Understanding the theory and historical findings may help
companies price their IPOs more closely to their market value which results in raising
more capital.
6.3. Limitations
There are a few limitations which affected the results and the generalization of them.
The first one is the sample size: 13 listings is a severely limited sample size when
compared to other studies done on the topic before. The sample sizes of previous
studies range from a hundred to thousands. Therefore, it may be debatable how
comparable the results of this study are in the general scope of IPO research.
However, the Finnish market is considerably smaller by standard than the other
markets discussed and therefore the results of the studies represent the market to the
best of their ability. The second limitation of this study is the methodology. While the
methodology chosen for this research is utilized in previous studies (Ritter, 1991;
Keloharju, 1993) the lack of statistical analysis (limited by the sample size) prevents
this study from reaching any significant conclusions.
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6.4. Suggestions for Further Research
Based on the findings and limitations of this study, there are a number of suggestions
for future research.
The main suggestion based on this thesis would be to conduct this study again but
with the whole sample of companies listed between 2005 and 2016. This would be
closer to the research done by Keloharju (1993), Westerhold (2006) and Hahl et al.
(2014) and would therefore be more comparable in general. It would also allow for
statistical measures to be used to measure significances and joint dependencies
between market returns and IPO returns. A more thorough study would also be able
to confirm or refute the results and hypotheses of this thesis.
Another suggestion would be to further examine the differences between small and
large IPOs as the differences found by this thesis seem to point at larger companies
succeeding better in the years after the IPO. However, a study like that would most
likely have to be conducted on another European market (e.g. Germany or Sweden)
due to the significantly higher number of IPOs and therefore larger companies listing.
It would also be possible to compare the returns within industries, something which
again is relatively complicated on the Finnish market due to the sample size.
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